



IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CLEVELAND COUNTY
STATE OF OKLAHOMA

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel.,)
MIKE HUNTER,)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA,)

Plaintiff,)

vs.)

- (1) PURDUE PHARMA L.P.;)
- (2) PURDUE PHARMA, INC.;)
- (3) THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY;)
- (4) TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.;)
- (5) CEPHALON, INC.;)
- (6) JOHNSON & JOHNSON;)
- (7) JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC;)
- (8) ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN)
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., n/k/a)
JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS;)
- (9) JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, INC.,)
n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.;)
- (10) ALLERGAN, PLC, f/k/a ACTAVIS PLC,)
f/k/a ACTAVIS, INC., f/k/a WATSON)
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.;)
- (11) WATSON LABORATORIES, INC.;)
- (12) ACTAVIS LLC; and)
- (13) ACTAVIS PHARMA, INC.,)
f/k/a WATSON PHARMA, INC.,)

Defendants.)

Case No. CJ-2017-816
Judge Thad Balkman

William C. Hetherington
Special Discovery Master

For Judge Balkman's
Consideration

STATE OF OKLAHOMA } S.S.
CLEVELAND COUNTY }

FILED
FEB 05 2019

In the office of the
Court Clerk MARILYN WILLIAMS

**THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE TEVA DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO
SPECIAL MASTER'S RULINGS ON STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH NOTICES TO
TAKE 3230 (C)(5) VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITIONS OF CORPORATE
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE**

The Teva Defendants' unremarkable Objection raises nothing that warrants reconsideration of the Special Discovery Master's Order quashing their Section 3230(C)(5) deposition notice. In his Order, the Special Master sustained the State's contentions that Teva's notice was improper because it: (1) was largely duplicative as to topics for which the State has already produced a witness; (2) sought privileged information; (3) sought information on topics

that were better suited for expert testimony; (4) constituted improper “contention discovery” in several respects; and (5) contained several topics that were either irrelevant and/or overly broad. What was true then remains true today. Unhappy with the ruling from the Special Master they selected, the Teva Defendants, in essence, seek a “do over” from this Court on issues that were fully briefed, argued, considered and rejected by the Special Master. The Teva Defendants’ Objection is more akin to a motion to reconsider, and such motions are not vehicles for a party to reargue arguments that were previously rejected or assert new arguments that should have been raised earlier.

Moreover, the Teva Defendants’ Objection is yet another attempt to delay this case. For example, as the State argued at the first hearing, the Teva notice, and their arguments in support, would essentially allow for each of the three defendant families to conduct a separate deposition of every single State witness. That is not what the Discovery Code permits and is not reasonable in this case for the reasons previously argued. Accordingly, for these reasons and those stated below, the Teva Defendants’ Objection should be overruled.

ARGUMENT

The Teva Defendants’ Objection is dead on arrival both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, as noted above, their purported objection reads like a motion to reconsider, and the law regarding such motions is persuasive and applicable here. For nearly twenty pages, the Teva Defendants regurgitate arguments that the Special Master fully considered at the January 17, 2019 hearing. They cite no new fact or law. They do not state that the Special Master ignored some part of the record or did not have a complete record in front of him. Thus, the Defendants’ Objection should be overruled as it seeks to revisit issues fully addressed by the Special Discovery Master without error.

In his now famous letter to the Oklahoma Bar, retired United States District Judge Wayne Alley pointedly observed “with dismay the alarming practice and regularity with which motions to reconsider are filed after a decision unfavorable to a party’s case” and asked whether “there [is] some misapprehension widely held in the bar that our court, in ruling on a motion after it is fully briefed, is just hitting a fungo[.]” Wayne E. Alley, *Letter and Attached Order*, 62 OKLA. B.J. 108, 109 (1991). “Many of the motions,” Judge Alley continued, “have as their tenor: ‘Aw come one, give us a break,’ or ‘You ruled against us so *ipso facto* you were wrong,’ or ‘You just didn’t understand the issue,’ or its variant ‘You are just so stupid that you didn’t understand the issue.’” *Id.* The Teva Defendants’ Objection reads much the same way. Despite the fact the Special Master specifically determined that Teva’s deposition notice was, in myriad ways, duplicative, overly broad, vastly overreaching, and impermissible, they raise the same arguments asserting the opposite. Just as the Special Master overruled the Teva Defendants’ arguments on these issues, the State respectfully requests that the Court do the same and overrule Defendants’ Objection on its face.

Nonetheless, even were this Court to consider the merits of Defendants’ Objection, the result is the same because the Teva Defendants are substantively wrong too:¹

I. The Oklahoma Discovery Code Disfavors Duplicative Discovery

The Oklahoma Discovery Code states that its provisions “shall be construed, administered and employed by courts and parties to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 3225. To this end, Section 3230 prohibits a deposition of a person who has been deposed in a case without leave of Court. *See id.* § 3230(A)(2)(A)(1). As the Special Master noted, the practice and procedure for discovery was for the defendant groups to participate in each deposition and propound questions that were not

¹ In this regard, the State adopts and incorporates its Motion to Quash as though fully set forth herein.

duplicative, but particular to that group's facts, circumstances and defense of this case. Teva's notice flouted this rule and sought to depose witnesses who had been deposed where Teva was noticed, present and either participated or had the opportunity to participate. *See* Order of Special Discovery Master at 4 (Jan. 20, 2019) (Exhibit A to Defendants' Objection) ("Here, Teva appears to seek to depose witnesses, many of whom have already been deposed where Teva was noticed, present and did participate or had the opportunity to participate."). Despite this, the Teva defendants' notice seeks, for example, testimony related to abatement and other topics about which previous witnesses—specifically, Jessica Hawkins, Jessica McGuire, and Jeff Stoneking—testified at their respective depositions. Teva was present at *all* of these depositions and made an appearance on the record. They do not get a second opportunity. And, Teva offers zero evidence that these topics were not already covered by the prior State witnesses on these topics.

The Special Master, who has been deeply involved in the discovery process and is in an appropriate position to evaluate the parties' respective claims on this issue, agreed with the State's contentions and quashed several of Defendants' topics for this very reason. *See* Order of Special Discovery Master at 4 (Jan. 20, 2019). Nothing in the Teva Defendants' Objection alters or changes this conclusion. The Special Master was correct to grant the State's Motion to Quash as to those topics addressed in his Order and his decision should be affirmed.

II. Defendants' Notice Included Several Improper Contention Depositions That Were Premature

Several topics in Teva's notice (Topic Nos. 2, 3, 4, 10, 14, 16, 24, 34, 37, and 38) were clearly contention depositions that requested information going to the heart of the State's factual and legal bases for its claims and asking for identification of every single instance the State alleges something occurred. As noted, "[c]ontention discovery, whether in the form of contention interrogatories or contention depositions, can be disruptive mainly because the very nature of

such questions will normally require the help of an attorney to assist the client in providing answers.” *BB & T Corp. v. United States*, 233 F.R.D. 447, 449 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (citation omitted). This is problematic because “[t]his type of discovery can add considerable expense to any lawsuit,” and “[i]n addition to the extra cost, when lawyers craft responses they will necessarily do so in a way that minimizes jeopardy to their client and, therefore, contention discovery may yield little additional useful information.” *Id.* 449-50.² Courts often find such discovery unnecessary because “contention discovery essentially requires a party to prepare a trial brief at an earlier time in the litigation process than normally occurs.” *Id.* The Special Master referred to this type of deposition as “very distasteful.” January 17, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 120:25-121:08, attached as Exhibit A hereto. Courts need a specific reason to require “such an acceleration,” because a court may find the “burden to outweigh the benefit.” *BB & T Corp., supra*. Typically, “the complaint, answer, disclosures, and discovery will provide sufficient information about a party’s position until such time as the filing of dispositive motions or trial briefs.” *Id.* Try as it may to reinvent the substance of its discovery requests, Teva’s contention deposition topics were improper and the Special Master’s Order should be upheld.

Moreover, the topics were premature. Even if a court finds a contention discovery to be necessary (which is rare), it is premature to allow for a contention deposition until the end of discovery. *Id.* at 450. Indeed, Oklahoma law states that courts “may order that such an interrogatory need not be answered until after designated discovery has been completed or until a pretrial conference or other later time.” Okla. Stat. tit., 12 § 3233(B). Thus, contention discovery in general is disfavored by courts, whether by interrogatory or deposition, and these topics were and remain premature. As the Special Master ordered, the State should not be required to sit for such depositions until such time as Teva completes its responses to the State’s long outstanding

² This is counterintuitive to the Discovery Code’s goal of securing the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.

discovery requests and has provided witnesses for the remaining depositions. *See* Order at 5. Other than recycled arguments, Defendants have presented no new grounds for review and the Special Master's decision should be affirmed.

III. The Teva Defendants' Notice Was Overly Broad

The Teva Defendants' Objection on this issue overlooks the mandate from Section 3226 that discovery be *reasonably calculated* to lead to admissible evidence and *proportional* to the needs of the case. Several topics noticed by Teva were irrelevant and/or overly broad. As observed by the State, the Teva Defendants sought information relating to "[t]he use and abuse in Oklahoma of controlled or regulated substances other than prescription opioids," despite the fact this case is about opioids. The Teva Defendants also sought to inquire about communications between the State and third-party insurers, payors or pharmacy benefits managers; communications between the State and any Oklahoma resident regarding opioid abuse, the State and any Healthcare Provider, and the State and any third-party insurer, payor or pharmacy regarding opioids manufactured by Teva. The Teva Defendants also sought deposition testimony on the entire State's "annual budget." These requests were plainly overbroad, unduly burdensome, and place an unfair burden on the State. The Special Master agreed and granted the State's Motion as to Topic Nos. 8, 19, 21, 24 25 and 27. The Teva Defendants have produced no new grounds for overturning the Special Master's decision and his Order should be affirmed.

IV. The Teva Defendants' Notice Sought Privileged Information

Continuing with their revisionist narrative, the Teva Defendants next argue that they do not seek privileged information, despite the fact the notice sought testimony on the State's investigatory files, pre-suit investigations, and patient data, to which some areas were previously deemed privileged by this Court and the Special Master, and others (i.e., pre-suit investigations)

clearly constitute documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. The Special Master's ruling on this issue was correct and should not be disturbed.


V. The Teva Defendants' Notice Impermissibly Sought Duplicative Expert Testimony

The Teva Defendants' Objection contends they only seek factual information as to the State's damages claim, its decision to reimburse any claims made to Soonercare or any other state-funded medical reimbursement plan for the Teva Defendants and Generic Actavis Defendants' products, and the identification of any false or fraudulent claims for the Teva Defendants and Generic Actavis Defendants' products made to these plans. However, the Teva Defendants conveniently ignore the fact that the State's damages model and issues related to causation are topics for which the State designated *expert* witnesses and provided expert disclosures. As the Stated noted in its Motion to Quash, deposing an additional corporate representative on these issues would be duplicative, cumulative, and not proportional to the needs of the case, in derogation of Oklahoma law. The Special Master weighed Defendants' need for evidence against these stated policies, and rightfully determined that Defendants' notice was duplicative and essentially sought testimony from the State's expert witnesses. The Teva Defendants have presented no new evidence or argument on this issue and the Special Master's Order should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that the Court overrule the Teva Defendants' Objection, affirm the Special Discovery Master's Order of January 20, 2019, and grant such further relief deemed equitable and just.

Respectfully submitted,



Michael Burrage, OBA No. 1350
Reggie Whitten, OBA No. 9576
WHITTEN BURRAGE
512 N. Broadway Avenue, Suite 300
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
Telephone: (405) 516-7800
Facsimile: (405) 516-7859
Emails: mburrage@whittenburrage.com
rwhitten@whittenburrage.com

Mike Hunter, OBA No. 4503
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Abby Dillsaver, OBA No. 20675
GENERAL COUNSEL TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Ethan A. Shaner, OBA No. 30916
DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
313 N.E. 21st Street
Oklahoma City, OK 73105
Telephone: (405) 521-3921
Facsimile: (405) 521-6246
Emails: abby.dillsaver@oag.ok.gov
ethan.shaner@oag.ok.gov

Bradley E. Beckworth, OBA No. 19982
Jeffrey J. Angelovich, OBA No. 19981
Trey Duck, OBA No. 33347
Drew Pate, *pro hac vice*
NIX PATTERSON, LLP
512 N. Broadway Avenue, Suite 200
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
Telephone: (405) 516-7800
Facsimile: (405) 516-7859
Emails: bbeckworth@nixlaw.com
jangelovich@nixlaw.com
tduck@nixlaw.com
dpate@nixlaw.com

Glenn Coffee, OBA No. 14563
GLENN COFFEE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
915 N. Robinson Ave.
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
Telephone: (405) 601-1616
Email: gcoffee@glenncoffee.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing was emailed on February 5, 2019 to:

Sanford C. Coats
Joshua D. Burns
CROWE & DUNLEVY, P.C.
Braniff Building
324 N. Robinson Ave., Ste. 100
Oklahoma City, OK 73102

Sheila Birnbaum
Mark S. Cheffo
Hayden A. Coleman
Paul A. Lafata
Jonathan S. Tam
Lindsay N. Zanello
Bert L. Wolff
Marina L. Schwartz
DECHERT, LLP
Three Bryant Park
1095 Avenue of Americas
New York, NY 10036-6797

Patrick J. Fitzgerald
R. Ryan Stoll
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER &
FLOM LLP
155 North Wacker Drive, Suite 2700
Chicago, Illinois 60606

Robert G. McCampbell
Nicholas Merkley
GABLEGOTWALS
One Leadership Square, 15th Floor
211 North Robinson
Oklahoma City, OK 73102-7255

Steven A. Reed
Harvey Bartle IV
Jeremy A. Menkowitz
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
1701 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921

Brian M. Ercole
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
200 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 5300
Miami, FL 33131

Benjamin H. Odom
John H. Sparks
Michael Ridgeway
David L. Kinney
ODOM, SPARKS & JONES PLLC
HiPoint Office Building
2500 McGee Drive Ste. 140
Oklahoma City, OK 73072

Stephen D. Brody
David Roberts
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
1625 Eye Street NW
Washington, DC 20006

Daniel J. Franklin
Ross Galin
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
7 Time Square
New York, NY 10036
Telephone: (212) 326-2000

Robert S. Hoff
WIGGIN & DANA, LLP
265 Church Street
New Haven, CT 06510

Britta Erin Stanton
John D. Volney
John Thomas Cox III
Eric Wolf Pinker
LYNN PINKER COX & HURST LLP 2100
Ross Avenue, Suite 2700 Dallas, TX 75201

Charles C. Lifland
Jennifer D. Cardelus
Wallace Moore Allan
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
400 S. Hope Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071

Larry D. Ottaway
Amy Sherry Fischer
FOLIART, HUFF, OTTAWAY & BOTTOM
201 Robert S. Kerr Ave, 12th Floor
Oklahoma City, OK 73102

Eric W. Snapp
DECHERT, LLP
Suite 3400
35 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60601

Benjamin Franklin McAnaney
DECHERT LLP
2929 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Amy Riley Lucas
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars, 8th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CLEVELAND COUNTY

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel.,)
MIKE HUNTER)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA,)

Plaintiff,)

vs.)

Case No. CJ-2017-816

- (1) PURDUE PHARMA L.P.;)
- (2) PURDUE PHARMA, INC.;)
- (3) THE PURDUE FREDERICK)
- COMPANY;)
- (4) TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS)
- USA, INC;)
- (5) CEPHALON, INC.;)
- (6) JOHNSON & JOHNSON;)
- (7) JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS,)
- INC.;)
- (8) ORTHO-McNEIL-JANSSEN)
- PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,)
- n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS;)
- (9) JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, INC.)
- n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS,)
- INC.;)
- (10) ALLERGAN, PLC, f/k/a)
- ACTAVIS PLC, f/k/a ACTAVIS,)
- INC., f/k/a WATSON)
- PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.;)
- (11) WATSON LABORATORIES, INC.;)
- (12) ACTAVIS LLC; AND)
- (13) ACTAVIS PHARMA, INC.,)
- f/k/a WATSON PHARMA, INC.,)

Defendants.)



**PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPT MAY BE COVERED UNDER PROTECTIVE ORDER
 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
 HAD ON JANUARY 17, 2019
 AT THE CLEVELAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE
 BEFORE THE HONORABLE THAD BALKMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE
 AND WILLIAM C. HETHERINGTON, JR.,
 RETIRED ACTIVE JUDGE AND SPECIAL DISCOVERY MASTER**

REPORTED BY: ANGELA THAGARD, CSR, RPR

1 disclosures. You're going to hear more about that from
2 Mr. Whitten later.

3 They have all the claims data. They have all the services
4 data. They have our expert reports. If they want to depose an
5 expert about what they say, they can do that. Having two
6 witnesses, again, sit for the same thing, doesn't make sense.
7 It's completely unnecessary. It's burdensome and cumulative.

8 There are several other topics that fall in this category,
9 your Honor. We've kind of drifted over into expert testimony
10 areas where we said in our brief that a lot of what they're
11 asking for, again, are things that we've said time and time
12 again are subject to expert testimony.

13 We've provided them our disclosures. We've provided them
14 dates that every single one of those experts can be deposed.
15 And what we said in our brief, your Honor, is that it doesn't
16 make sense to have, again, two people sit to testify about the
17 same thing; depose our experts.

18 Topics 6, 7, and 9 are all about expert testimony.
19 They're about damages and causation, the exact types of things
20 that this Court has already addressed with respect to the
21 interrogatories and said that we've got a scheduling order in
22 place, it says when expert disclosures are going to happen,
23 says when expert discovery is going to close, and that's what
24 we're going to go with. So that's what we're doing.

25 The next category of topics, your Honor, falls into what

1 we call contention depositions. It's a lot like a contention
2 interrogatory, except you say you want a witness to say
3 everything instead of writing it down on paper.

4 And I see you smiling. And I don't know if it's because
5 you have a question or if it's because you've dealt with these
6 a lot before, but --

7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]

9 MR. PATE: Well, maybe I'll just move on then. I
10 agree that they're distasteful.

11 THE COURT: I mean -- well, go ahead.

12 MR. PATE: Here's what I'll say about these, Judge.
13 I think that the ones that they've asked for here are in large
14 part a waste of time. I think that the case law says that
15 they're burdensome. I think the case law actually says that an
16 interrogatory is better than a contention deposition.

17 What the cases all agree on is that if you are going to do
18 this and if the Court chooses to allow it, then it needs to
19 happen at the end of the discovery.

20 THE COURT: Yeah. And let me sort of help frame a
21 response on this one. You know, of course, this is a unique
22 case. And in the past when I've dealt with this, it's always
23 been, Look, let's do this through interrogatory answers and
24 then get the interrogatory answer done, and then if it is a
25 witness that's going to be called to testify, whether it's a